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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

HAROLD BEEMER,

Case No.
11688

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF CASE AND DISPOSITION
IN LOWER COURT
Defendant appeals from a jury conviction on
March 27, 1969, for passing and uttering a ficticious
check in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-26-7 (1953).
He was sentenced to an indeterminate term in the
Utah State Prison of one to ten years by Judge
Charles G. Cowley of the Second Judicial District
Court, in and for Weber County, State of Utah.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the jury verdict of
guilty and sentence passed thereupon should be
affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's recital of facts is substantially correct. Respondent's additions and corrections are
made hereinafter.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION IN PERMITTING THE STA TE TO INTRODUCE DEFENDANT'S ALIAS IN EVIDENCE.

It is an elementary proposition that the trial
judge has wide discretion in passing upon the admissibility of evidence. Ernest F. Kyriopoulos of the
State Driver's License Division testified for the prosecution that the defendant used an alias, Richard
Feeney, on his application for a driver's license.
After an objection by the defense, Judge Cowley
reserved a ruling on the materiality of this evidence
upon the prosecution's offer to connect it up to the
jury issues (T. 41). Contrary to appellant's allegation, the State did endeavor to demonstrate the materiality of the alias. The check in issue at the trial,
allegedly signed by an "Ethel Norris", bore a handwritten account number differing in only one digit
from defendant's own account number (T. 51-53). The
prosecution attempted to show, by reference to another of defendant's checks signed Richard Feeney
bearing a handwritten account number, that defendant knew from memory his own account number (T. 100-03). The evidence of the alias was necessary to connect the two checks, and hence, an essential part of the evidential chain.
Further, it is difficult to imagine how this evidence could have inflammed the jury to the point
that reversible error was committed. Appellant
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strangely regards admission of the alias more prejudicial than his own evidence of his two prior convictions for writing checks on insufficent funds (T.
69-70).
"After hearing an appeal the court must
give judgment without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights
of the parties. If error has been committed,
it shall not be presumed to have resulted in
prejudice. The Court must be satisfied that it
has that effect before it is warranted in reversing the judgment." Utah Code Ann. §
77-42-1 (1953).

POINT II
APPELLANT'S WAIVER OF AN EIGHT MAN JURY
AND HIS CONSENT TO BE TRIED BY A JURY OF
SEVEN ARE VALID IN LAW.

When one of the jurors tryng appellant's case
became ill, the defense stipulated that the trial could
continue with seven jurors.
MR. RICHARDS: "Your Honor, based upon the
fact that one of the jurors has become ill since
the beginning of the trial, the defendant is
willing to stipulate that the jury now empaneled may determine the case with a number of seven on the jury in lieu of the eight."
(T. 61)

It is well settled in all federal and state courts
which have considered the matter that a defendant
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may waive his right to a full jury and consent to be
tried by fewer than the constitutional or statutory
number. This rule is most frequently applied in the
"sick juror" cases, to-wit: Patton z:. United States, 281
U.S. 276, 312 (1930); Beatty v. United States, 377 F.2d 181,
185 (1967); Williams z:. United States, 332 F2d 36, 39
(1964); Timmons u. State, 223 Ga. 450, 156 S.E.2d 68, 69
(1968); State v. Robbins, 176 Ohio 362, 199 N.E.2d 742
(1964); Holloway v. State, 365 P.2d 829, 831 (Okla. Crim.
1961).
Appellant contends that Utah Code Ann. § 7846-5 (1953) makes an eight man jury in a felony case
"unwaivable."
"A trial jury in capital cases shall consist
of twelve jurors. A trial jury in other criminal
cases and in civil cases in the District Courts
shall consist of eight jurors; provided, that in
civil cases and cases of misdemeanors the jury
may consist of any number less than eight upon
which the parties may agree in open court.... "

Although this statute does not specifically give
appellant the right to stipulate to be tried by a jury
of fewer than eight, the right to waive a trial by 0
full jury has existed historically and is not extin guished by the statute. California has dealt several
times with this identical problem. Article 1, S0ctb:r
7 of the California Constitution after which the Utah
statute was patterned provides as follows:
"In civil actions and cases of misdemeanors the jmy may consist of twelve, or of
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any number less than twelve upon which the
parties may agree in open court."

The argument that this impliedly excludes, by
failing to mention, felony cases has been rejected in
a number of cases, to-wit: People v. Ragsdale, 177 Cal.
App. 2d 676, 2 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1964); People v. Patterson,
169 Cal. App. 2d 179, 186-87, 337 P.2d 163, 168 (1959);
People v. Williams, 128 Cal. App. 2d 458, 465, 275 P.2d
513, 517 (1954); People v. Clark, 24 Cal. App. 2d 302,
74 P.2d 1070 (1938).
The ancient rule of expresso unius est exclusio alternius
should not be applied when it will serve to extinguish an established custom, usage or practice. 2
Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 4917 at 421 (3d.
ed. F. Horack, 1943). As indicated by the cases cited
above, it is a standard practice to permit defendant
to waive trial by a full jury and consent to be tried
by a smaller jury. No worthwhile purpose would
be served by permitting appellant to affirm at trial,
then deny on appeal, the competency of a seven
man jury to decide his case.
CONCLUSION
Permitting an alias used by the defendant to be
introduced in evidence was not an abuse of the trial
court's broad discretionary powers. The prosecution
connected up the evidence, but even if it had not,
its admission cannot be considered reversible error.
Appellant should not be granted a new trial on the
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grounds that he should not have been permitted
to stipulate to a smaller jury. Even if this were error,
it was appellant's own error.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General

LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assist.ant Attorney
General
236 Stare Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondent

